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# **Committee on Criminal Justice Appropriations**

9:00am – 4:00pm

Wednesday, February 15, 2006

404 HOB

## **Revised**

# Committee Meeting Notice

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Speaker Allan G. Bense

(AMENDED 2/10/2006 3:06:36PM)

Amended(1)

### Criminal Justice Appropriations Committee

**Start Date and Time:** Wednesday, February 15, 2006 09:00 am

**End Date and Time:** Wednesday, February 15, 2006 04:00 pm

**Location:** 404 HOB

**Duration:** 7.00 hrs

Continuation of unfinished presentations and discussions from previous day's agenda

Workshop on juvenile boot camps

Budget workshop

**NOTICE FINALIZED on 02/10/2006 15:06 by KAG**



# **Florida House of Representatives**

Fiscal Council

Committee on Criminal Justice Appropriations

**Allan Bense**  
Speaker

**Gustavo Barreiro**  
Chair

**AGENDA**  
**COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPROPRIATIONS**  
**WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2006**  
**9:00am - 4:00pm**  
**404 HOB**

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- I. Roll Call and opening comments by Chair Barreiro**
  - II. Unfinished business from Tuesday, February 14, 2006 meeting**
  - III. Juvenile boot camp workshop**
  - IV. Adjourn**



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# **Committee on Criminal Justice Appropriations**

**9:00am – 4:00pm**

**Wednesday, February 15, 2006**

**404 HOB**

**Addendum "A"**

JUNE 03

U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Justice Programs  
*National Institute of Justice*



**NIJ**

Research for Practice



Correctional Boot Camps: Lessons From a Decade of Research

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NIJ

JUNE 03

## Correctional Boot Camps: Lessons From a Decade of Research

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the author and do not reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The analysis reported here was supported by contract numbers 96-SC-LX-001, 96-SC-LX-002, 96-SC-LX-003, 96-SC-LX-004, and 96-SC-LX-005, supported by funds transferred to the National Institute of Justice from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

NCJ 197018

## ABOUT THIS REPORT

Can a program designed to improve an inmate's attitudes and behaviors reduce the likelihood that he or she will commit another crime after release from prison? Could such a program reduce prison populations and costs? This Research for Practice reports on 10 years of data analyzing the success or failure of correctional boot camps to meet these goals.

### What did the researchers find?

The studies of boot camps produced mixed results:

- Participants reported positive short-term changes in attitudes and behaviors; they also had better problem-solving and coping skills.
- With few exceptions, these positive changes did not lead to reduced recidivism. The boot camps that did produce lower recidivism rates offered more treatment services, had longer sessions, and included more intensive postrelease

supervision. However, not all programs with these features had successful results.

- Under a narrow set of conditions, boot camps can lead to small relative reductions in prison populations and correctional costs.

### What were the study's limitations?

The author reviewed and compiled data from studies of boot camps published over a period of 10 years. Each boot camp studied had a different design. This lack of uniformity made it difficult to assess what components were and were not successful. Also, each study used a different method to evaluate the program, which made comparing their findings difficult.

### Who should read this study?

Correctional administrators at adult and juvenile facilities and State and local policymakers.



Dale G. Parent

## Correctional Boot Camps: Lessons From a Decade of Research



In response to rising rates of serious crime, many correctional systems established boot camps as an alternative sanction that might reduce recidivism, prison populations, and operating costs. Despite a decade of popularity with policymakers and the public, boot camps have had difficulty meeting these objectives.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored an analysis of research conducted over a 10-year period beginning in the late 1980s. This analysis concluded that—

- ✦ Boot camps generally had positive effects on the attitudes, perceptions, behavior, and skills of inmates during their confinement.
- ✦ With limited exceptions, these positive changes did not translate into reduced recidivism.
- ✦ Boot camps can achieve small *relative* reductions in prison populations and modest reductions in correctional costs under a narrow set of conditions (admitting offenders with

a high likelihood of otherwise serving a conventional prison term and offering discounts in time served to those who complete boot camps).

The surveyed research identified three factors largely responsible for the failure of boot camps to reach goals related to prison population and recidivism:

- ✦ Mandates to reduce prison populations through early release made volunteering for boot camps unnecessary as a means of shortening sentences.
- ✦ Lack of a standard boot camp model.
- ✦ Insufficient focus on offenders' reentry into the community.

The camps' disciplined structure and therapeutic programs eliminated idleness and created a safer environment, which in turn improved inmate attitudes and behavior. Such structure, coupled with a therapeutic orientation, may apply to other correctional programs, especially

### About the Author

Between 1988 and 1997, Dale G. Parent, a Senior Associate at Abt Associates Inc., conducted studies of correctional boot camps for the National Institute of Justice.

those that target youthful offenders.

### Why boot camps?

As the name implies, correctional boot camps are in-prison programs that resemble military basic training. They emphasize vigorous physical activity, drill and ceremony, manual labor, and other activities that ensure that participants have little, if any, free time. Strict rules govern all aspects of conduct and appearance. Correctional officers act as drill instructors, initially using intense verbal tactics designed to break down inmates' resistance and lead to constructive changes.

**Three generations of camps.** Boot camps proliferated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By 1995, State correctional agencies operated 75 boot camps for adults, State and local agencies operated 30 juvenile boot camps, and larger counties operated 18 boot camps in local jails.<sup>1</sup>

The camps evolved over time. Early research findings shaped subsequent boot camp policies and the design and operation of new programs.

Although first-generation camps stressed military discipline, physical training, and hard work, second-generation camps emphasized rehabilitation by adding such components as alcohol and drug treatment and prosocial skills training. Some also added intensive postrelease supervision that may include electronic monitoring, home confinement, and random urine tests. A few camps admitted females, but this proved somewhat controversial (see "Females in Boot Camps"). Recently, some boot camps, particularly those for juveniles, have substituted an emphasis on educational and vocational skills for the military components to provide comparable structure and discipline.<sup>2</sup>

After the mid-1990s, the number of boot camps declined. By 2000, nearly one-third of State prison boot camps had closed—only 51 camps remained. The average daily population in State boot camps also dropped more than 30 percent.<sup>3</sup>

**Boot camps' goals.** Boot camps had three main goals: reducing recidivism, reducing prison populations, and reducing costs.

### FEMALES IN BOOT CAMPS

Some boot camp programs began accepting eligible female inmates in the early 1990s, but concerns soon emerged about whether the boot camp strategy is appropriate for women.

Findings from the limited research on female boot camp participants and their high dropout rate clearly indicate that this population faces unique problems. A 1992 study<sup>a</sup> noted that the programs were designed for males and did not accommodate women's special needs or problems.

- **Female inmates are more likely to have children and be the sole parent for those children.** Boot camps often restricted, or even banned, visitation, creating difficult situations for mothers and their children. Also, the programs did not teach parenting skills.
- **Female inmates are more likely to have a history of physical or sexual abuse.** Although female inmates were four to five times more likely than male inmates to have been victims of physical or sexual abuse, most camps had no programs to help them cope with or avoid victimization. Derogatory boot camp tactics tended to retraumatize domestic violence victims.
- **Female inmates are more likely to have a different history and pattern of drug use than males.** Most substance abuse treatment used therapies designed for males.
- **Female inmates are more likely to have been unemployed before imprisonment.** Boot camps did little to prepare women for employment after release.

Female inmates at boot camps reported high stress levels, which may be why they tended to drop out of boot camp at a higher rate than male inmates. Stress stemmed from a physical training regimen designed for males, drill instructors' "in your face" tactics; lack of other female participants, often leading to isolation within the camp; and cross-gender supervision.

A 1998 study<sup>b</sup> described features of successful prison programs for females, most of which were absent from boot camps. These features include the following:

- Using women staff members as role models.
- Addressing participants' prior victimization by building self-esteem and emphasizing empowerment and self-sufficiency.
- Using nonaggressive program management styles.

### Notes

a. MacKenzie et al. 1996.

b. Morash, Bynum, and Koons 1998.

Camps were expected to reduce recidivism by changing inmates' attitudes, values, and behaviors and by addressing factors that increase the likelihood of returning to prison (such as lack of job skills, addiction, and inability to control anger). Camps were expected to reduce prison populations by shortening time served. Reduced length of stay was expected to reduce costs.

### Reducing recidivism— an unmet goal

NIJ evaluation studies consistently showed that boot camps did not reduce recidivism regardless of whether the camps were for adults or juveniles or whether they were first-generation programs with a heavy military emphasis or later programs with more emphasis on treatment. Most of the research suggested that the limitations of boot camps prevented them from reducing recidivism or prison populations, even as they achieved other goals. These limitations mostly resulted from—

#### ✱ **Low “dosage” effects.**

The length of stay in boot camps—usually from 90 to 120 days—was too brief to realistically affect recidivism.

✱ **Insufficient preparation of boot camp inmates for reentry into the community.** Many boot camps provided little or no postrelease programming to prepare graduates to lead productive lives. In addition, the intensive supervision common to later generations of boot camps meant heightened surveillance levels for boot camp graduates. These factors combined to magnify the high rates of return for technical parole violations.

✱ **Conflicting or unrealistic goals or mandates set by State legislatures.** For example, most boot camp programs sought to reduce prison populations. Shorter programs more effectively meet this goal, but they also lower dosage effects and reduce the likelihood that treatment programs will work, thereby potentially increasing recidivism.

✱ **The absence of a strong underlying treatment model.** Pragmatism and local politics often affected boot camp structure more than theory and research results. In fact, this lack of consistent design and approach made controlled scientific analysis difficult (see “Researching the

### RESEARCHING THE RESEARCH: A THUMBNAIL REVIEW

The author reviewed boot camp studies to determine the effects of these camps on participants and whether their goals were achieved or even achievable. The first published boot camp study (1989) informed practitioners about existing programs and called for rigorous evaluations.<sup>a</sup> Subsequent research included—

- A multisite evaluation of boot camps in several States.<sup>b</sup>
- Studies of camps receiving funds under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.<sup>c</sup>
- A multisite process and evaluation study of three juvenile boot camps.<sup>d</sup>
- Evaluations funded by State and local governments.<sup>e</sup>

Although study findings were remarkably consistent, some of the methods of deriving results and conclusions illustrate the difficulties in researching phenomena as complex as correctional boot camps.

### Designing for the Differences

Most evaluations compared boot camp graduates with non-boot camp correctional inmates. One problem with this approach was that differences could have stemmed from differences among members of the two groups, rather than from boot camp effects. Researchers tried to match group members on important variables and to control statistically for known differences. A few evaluations used random assignment of eligible subjects, lowering the possibility of differences among groups.

### Estimating Elusive Cost Savings

Most studies that examined boot camps' cost impact multiplied the estimated charges attributed to the boot camp in person-days of confinement by the average operating costs for each person-day of confinement. However, this approach may overstate cost savings because staffing costs will not vary unless changes in confinement person-days are large enough to allow the actual closing of facilities. Small population reductions avert marginal costs only. Moreover, States vary in how they determine costs, making comparisons across States problematic.

### Counting Hypothetically Empty Beds

Some findings about boot camps, especially those involving the impact on prison populations, are hypothetical because they are derived from simulations and calculations based on projections, rather than on actual results.

—continued on page 6

### Researching the Research (continued)

For example, a key element used to determine boot camp impact on required prison bed space was the probability that boot camp entrants would have been imprisoned if the boot camp did not exist. Modeling in one study showed that the probability of imprisonment for boot camp entrants would have to be very high to reach a "break-even" point of overall prison population.<sup>1</sup> If the probability of imprisonment for boot camp entrants were not high enough, the camp's existence would actually *increase* prison population.

For the probability of imprisonment factor to fall below a break-even (thereby hypothetically reducing the prison population), correctional officials needed to select offenders who were *already sentenced*. If judges selected boot camp participants before sentencing, this would not reduce the prison population according to these calculations.

### Untangling Findings and Results

Many studies had ambiguous findings. Although NIJ's multisite evaluation<sup>2</sup> found no difference overall in recidivism between boot camp graduates and the comparison groups, three of the eight sites may have had lower recidivism. These sites had better treatment services, longer program duration, and more intensive postrelease supervision.

However, some of the other five boot camps also had these components, and the apparent reason for lower recidivism in two of the three sites was different from the third. Evaluators admitted they could not "untangle the particular effects of each program component on recidivism."<sup>3</sup> Focusing on what they could prove, they concluded that "the core elements of boot camp programs—military-style discipline, hard labor, and physical training—by themselves did not reduce offender recidivism." Finally, they speculated that for programs to affect recidivism, "it is likely that some mixture of rehabilitation and intensive followup supervision plays an important role."<sup>4</sup>

### Notes

a. See Parent 1989.

b. See MacKenzie and Souryal 1994.

c. Parent et al. 1999; Zhang 1999; MacKenzie et al. 2001; Lewis et al. 1996; Austin 2000.

d. Peters et al. 1997.

e. Flowers et al. 1991.

f. Parent 1994.

g. MacKenzie and Souryal 1994; MacKenzie et al. 1995.

h. MacKenzie and Hebert 1996, p. 293.

i. Ibid.

Research: A Thumbnail Review").

**Adult recidivism.** A multisite evaluation sponsored by NIJ could not establish a difference in recidivism between adult boot camp graduates and comparison group members, although the research indicated that more treatment services, longer programs, and intensive post-release supervision may lower recidivism.<sup>4</sup>

Other research on adult boot camps in Georgia and Illinois found no difference in recidivism.<sup>5</sup> An evaluation of Washington's Work Ethic Camp<sup>6</sup> (WEC) actually found higher recidivism, from high rates of revoked parole. Most of these were technical violations.<sup>7</sup> One study found that Oregon adult boot camp graduates had significantly lower recidivism than the comparison group, but results were flawed because camp dropouts were excluded from the analysis.<sup>8</sup>

**Juvenile recidivism.** Results from juvenile boot camp studies are similar: Random-assignment evaluations in California and Indiana and a multisite evaluation sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) found no significant differences in re-

cidivism rates between boot camp participants and comparison groups. In some cases, boot camp graduates had higher rates of recidivism.<sup>9</sup>

### **Improving behavior— a success story**

Boot camps were almost universally successful in improving inmates' attitudes and behavior during the course of the program; they also produced safer environments for staff and residents, presumably due to their highly structured atmosphere and activities.

Several studies indicated that adult boot camp participants had better attitudes about their confinement experiences and had improved their prosocial attitudes more than comparison group members.<sup>10</sup> One study concluded that inmates in adult boot camps had increased self-esteem, reduced antisocial attitudes, increased problem-solving skills, improved coping skills, and improved social support.<sup>11</sup> In other studies, boot camp inmates improved their self-esteem and standardized education scores in reading and math more than comparison group members.<sup>12</sup>

Anxiety and depression declined to a greater degree

among juveniles in boot camps than among those in comparison facilities.<sup>13</sup> Dysfunctional impulsivity (the inability to control one's impulses) increased among youths in comparison facilities but decreased among boot camp participants. Social attitudes improved among youths in boot camps, but worsened among those in comparison facilities.

### **Reducing prison population—mixed results**

NIJ-sponsored boot camp researchers agree that correctional boot camps might achieve small *relative*<sup>14</sup> reductions in prison populations. Boot camps could reduce the number of prison beds needed in a jurisdiction, which would lead to modest reductions in correctional costs.

NIJ's multisite study<sup>15</sup> concluded that adult boot camp programs in Louisiana and New York reduced their need for prison beds. Two other studies<sup>16</sup> found that WEC and an Illinois camp reduced prison bed-space requirements.<sup>17</sup> Researchers also

concluded that juvenile boot camps reduced the needed number of correctional beds in South Dakota and Oregon.<sup>18</sup>

However, restrictive entry criteria for boot camp participants often made it impossible to reduce prison populations. For example, some jurisdictions required that boot camp inmates be nonviolent offenders convicted of their first felony. This small pool of eligible candidates typically serves short prison terms before parole. These inmates had little incentive to volunteer for boot camps that would not shorten their terms. When inmates sentenced to longer prison terms were recruited, however, a reduction in time served became a compelling incentive.

Efforts to meet the recidivism goal may work against meeting population and cost reduction goals. For example, lengthening a boot camp term to add more treatment programs in order to reduce the chances of recidivism would shorten the discount in time served and, thus, not reduce the population or prison bed costs.<sup>19</sup>



## Conclusions

Correctional practitioners and planners might learn from boot camps' failure to reduce recidivism or prison populations by considering the following:

- ✱ Building reintegration into the community into an inmate's individual program and reentry plans may improve the likelihood he or she will not commit a new offense.
- ✱ Programs that offered substantial discounts in time served to those who completed boot camps and that chose candidates sentenced to serve longer terms were the most successful in reducing prison populations.
- ✱ Chances of reducing recidivism increased when boot camp programs lasted longer and offered more intensive treatment and postrelease supervision, activities that may conflict with the goal of reducing population.

Efforts to achieve multiple goals are likely the overall cause of boot camps' conflicting results. Program designers are urged to determine which options are best for their jurisdictions; for example, they may consider

whether to implement more treatment programs or move inmates out of the system more rapidly. These decisions affect costs, as prison bed-space savings go up or down.

Other correctional programs are adopting some of the important elements of boot camps—for example, carefully structured programs that reduce idleness—to increase safety and improve conditions of confinement for younger offenders.<sup>20</sup> However, in recent years, some jurisdictions facing rising costs have responded by cutting programs. One lesson for policymakers from 10 years of boot camp research is that curtailing programs may lead to increased violence, misconduct, and serious management problems.

## Notes

1. Camp and Camp 2001a, 2001b.
2. Gransky et al. 1995.
3. Camp and Camp 2001a.
4. MacKenzie and Souryal 1994; MacKenzie et al. 1995.
5. See Flowers et al. 1991; Austin 2000.
6. See Austin 2000.
7. Prosecutors often decide against trying offenders on new crimes

because parole officials can revoke parole for technical violations. If revocations and returns for technical violations are reduced, new convictions may increase.

8. The program had a 52-percent failure rate. See Austin 2000.

9. See Bottcher and Isorena 1994; Austin 2000; Zhang 1999; Peters et al. 1997.

10. See MacKenzie and Souryal 1994.

11. See Austin 2000.

12. Clark et al. 1994; Bottcher and Isorena 1994; Peters et al. 1997.

13. MacKenzie et al. 2001.

14. Boot camps were unlikely to lower *absolute* prison population levels. The camps opened during a time when major changes in sentencing policies and practices caused prison populations to soar. Even at the height of their popularity, the total capacity of boot camps was minuscule compared to the total prison population.

15. See MacKenzie and Piquero 1994, pp. 222–249; MacKenzie and Souryal 1994. A later study of the New York network of boot camps reached the same conclusion: see Clark et al. 1994.

16. See Parent et al. 1999; Austin 2000.

17. See Austin 2000.

18. See Parent et al. 1999.

19. Ibid.

20. OJJDP's Performance-based Standards project seeks to improve

conditions by establishing standards for correctional facilities and programs. More information may be found at <http://www.performance-standards.org/>.

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# *Sheriff Grady Judd*

## *Polk County*

455 N. Broadway • Bartow, FL 33830-3998 • Phone: 863.534.6200 • [www.polksheriff.org](http://www.polksheriff.org)

February 14, 2006

Jim Debeaugrine  
Staff Director, Criminal Justice Appropriations Committee  
402 S. Monroe, 221 Capitol  
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1300

Dear Mr. DeBeaugrine:

Thank you for inviting me to attend the Criminal Justice Appropriations Committee hearing scheduled for Wednesday, February 15, 2006 in Tallahassee to discuss our boot camp. Unfortunately, due to scheduling conflicts, I will not be able attend the meeting. Please express my sincere apologies and regrets to the members of the committee and to Chairman Barreiro. Staff from the Department of Juvenile Justice will be available to discuss the statistics, qualities, program components, and successes of our program and other boot camp programs.

We have enjoyed a productive partnership with the Department of Juvenile Justice and with the Florida Legislature as we have operated the Polk County Juvenile Boot Camp in Bartow, Florida. We know we have positively impacted crime in Polk County, turned many troubled young lives around, and safeguarded the property and quality of life of our community because of our very successful boot camp.

As indicated by DJJ's 2005 QA performance scores in the 2005 Bureau of Quality Assurance Annual Report, the Polk County Sheriff's Office Boot Camp is the highest rated program in the state (pg. X1-338), with a performance score of 90% and the *only* juvenile program with a performance rating of "Exceptional Performance."

**"The Department of Juvenile Justice contracts with many private providers to operate juvenile justice programs. The highest ranking provider is Polk County Sheriff's Office with a performance score of 90 percent." – 2005 Bureau of Quality Assurance Annual Report, p. XI-338**

I am proud of our high standards and solid record of performance. We welcome any input you can provide that will help us do our job better. I look forward to our continued successful partnership.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Grady Judd".

Grady Judd

SHERIFF, POLK COUNTY

# Performance by Provider Agency

The Department of Juvenile Justice contracts with many private providers to operate juvenile justice programs. The following table lists the provider organizations by overall 2005 QA performance scores. The highest ranking provider is Polk County Sheriff's Office with a performance score of 90 percent. The lowest ranking provider is the Monroe County Sheriff's Office that operates one Intensive Delinquency Diversion program.

Provider	# of Programs	Performance Score	Performance Rating
Polk County Sheriff's Office	1	90%	Exceptional Performance
Youth Crisis Center	1	88%	Commendable Performance
PACE Center for Girls, Inc.	11	87%	Commendable Performance
Sunshine Youth Services	2	87%	Commendable Performance
Bay Area Youth Services, Inc.	3	86%	Commendable Performance
Florida City Police Department	1	86%	Commendable Performance
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services	1	85%	Commendable Performance
Corner Drug Store, Inc.	1	84%	Commendable Performance
Sarasota County Government	1	84%	Commendable Performance
Stewart Marchman Center	2	84%	Commendable Performance
Youth and Family Alternatives, Inc.	1	84%	Commendable Performance
Manatee County Sheriff's Office	2	83%	Commendable Performance
Osceola County	1	83%	Commendable Performance
Group 4 Securicor	5	82%	Commendable Performance
Keystone Education and Youth Services, Inc.	1	82%	Commendable Performance
Miami-Dade County Human Services	1	82%	Commendable Performance
Pasco County Sheriff's Office	1	82%	Commendable Performance
State Operated Detention	15	82%	Commendable Performance
Tampa Police Department	1	82%	Commendable Performance
Agency for Community Treatment Services	3	81%	Commendable Performance
Lighthouse Care Centers, LLC	1	81%	Commendable Performance
North American Family Institute	1	81%	Commendable Performance
Sarasota Family YMCA, Inc.	2	81%	Commendable Performance
Department of Human Services	1	80%	Commendable Performance
Devereaux of Florida	1	80%	Commendable Performance
James E. Scott Community Association	1	80%	Commendable Performance
Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc.	15	79%	Acceptable Performance
Martin County Sheriff's Office	2	79%	Acceptable Performance
FL Keys' Children's Shelter	1	78%	Acceptable Performance
Twin Oaks Juvenile Development, Inc.	1	78%	Acceptable Performance
Associated Marine Institute	21	77%	Acceptable Performance
Center for Family and Child Enrichment	1	77%	Acceptable Performance
Global Redirection Services	5	77%	Acceptable Performance
Orange County Board of County Commissioners	2	77%	Acceptable Performance
City of Opa Locka	1	76%	Acceptable Performance
Juvenile Services Programs, Inc.	2	76%	Acceptable Performance

*continued*

Table 16. Male Residential Programs Listed by Program Type

Restrictiveness Level	Program Type/Program Name	N	Observed Recidivism Rate	Expected Recidivism Range	Percent Difference*	Two-Year Expenditures	Cost per Completion	PAM Score	Effectiveness Category	Cost Category
<b>Low Risk-Male</b>										
Low	Alligator Short-Term Offender Program Camp	227	42%	42% - 43%	0%	\$1,485,720	\$6,545	76	Average	Low
Low	Blackwater Short-Term Offender Program Camp (CSC)	15	47%	40% - 49%	0%	\$389,719	\$25,981	73	Average	Low
Low	Blackwater STOP Camp (State-Operated) (Provider changed)	151	54%	50% - 52%	2%	\$897,397	\$5,943	70	Below Average	Low
Low	Brevard Group Treatment Home	58	66%	53% - 57%	9%	\$1,818,354	\$31,351	43	Least Effective	Moderate
Low	Dade Group Treatment Home	23	65%	47% - 53%	12%	\$614,685	\$26,725	42	Least Effective	Moderate
Low	Eckerd Youth Conservation Academy	115	46%	44% - 46%	0%	\$4,271,636	\$37,145	71	Average	Moderate
Low	Escambia River Outward Bound	178	52%	49% - 50%	1%	\$3,388,889	\$19,039	71	Below Average	Low
Low	Florida Youth Academy-Male Low Risk (Closed)	75	61%	52% - 55%	6%	\$1,029,960	\$13,733	55	Least Effective	Low
Low	Forestry Youth Academy	77	47%	44% - 47%	0%	\$3,154,076	\$40,962	71	Average	High
Low	Jonathan Dickinson Short-Term Offender Program Camp	121	39%	39% - 41%	-1%	\$1,200,853	\$9,924	79	Effective	Low
Low	Manatee Wilderness Camp (Closed)	137	39%	39% - 41%	-1%	\$2,340,486	\$17,084	78	Effective	Low
Low	Peace River Outward Bound	82	66%	56% - 58%	7%	\$2,972,165	\$36,246	49	Least Effective	Moderate
Low	Rilla White Foundation Family Homes-Male	98	49%	46% - 48%	1%	\$2,333,849	\$23,815	70	Below Average	Low
Low	South Pines Low Risk	135	44%	43% - 44%	0%	\$2,813,970	\$20,844	74	Average	Low
Low	STEP I-Male	277	38%	38% - 39%	-1%	\$1,843,673	\$6,656	79	Effective	Low
Low	Withlacoochee Juvenile Residential Facility	69	38%	39% - 42%	-1%	\$923,024	\$13,377	78	Effective	Low
<b>Developmentally Disabled-Male</b>										
Moderate	RAMC-Mentally Challenged (DISC) (Provider changed)	63	57%	50% - 53%	4%	\$3,272,741	\$51,948	56	Least Effective	High
<b>Moderate Risk-Male</b>										
Moderate	ARC Halfway House	240	38%	39% - 40%	-1%	\$7,292,415	\$30,385	76	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	ATC Boys Halfway House	141	33%	35% - 36%	-2%	\$3,814,447	\$27,053	79	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Avon Park Youth Academy	413	35%	35% - 36%	-1%	\$11,515,611	\$27,883	76	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Bay Point Schools-North	58	29%	35% - 38%	-5%	\$1,951,268	\$33,643	88	Highly Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Bay Point Schools-West-Kennedy	322	36%	37% - 37%	-1%	\$10,642,895	\$33,052	75	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Big Cypress Wilderness Institute	85	42%	42% - 44%	0%	\$2,599,449	\$30,582	72	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Bristol Youth Academy	172	43%	42% - 44%	0%	\$4,462,380	\$25,944	73	Average	Low
Moderate	Britt Halfway House	74	51%	47% - 50%	2%	\$1,865,413	\$25,208	67	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Camp E-How-Kee (Closed)	67	36%	38% - 41%	-2%	\$2,226,640	\$33,233	78	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Camp E-Kel-Etu	64	44%	42% - 45%	0%	\$3,718,384	\$58,100	68	Average	High
Moderate	Camp E-Ma-Chamee	72	65%	55% - 58%	8%	\$3,948,611	\$54,842	42	Least Effective	High

\* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole percent



Table 16, (Continued). Male Residential Programs Listed by Program Type

Restrictiveness Level	Program Type/Program Name	N	Observed Recidivism Rate	Expected Recidivism Range	Percent Difference*	Two-Year Expenditures	Cost per Completion	PAM Score	Effectiveness Category	Cost Category
<b>Moderate Risk-Male (continued)</b>										
Moderate	Camp E-Tu-Makee	62	61%	52% - 55%	6%	\$3,612,880	\$58,272	48	Least Effective	High
Moderate	Crossroads Wilderness Institute	92	28%	33% - 35%	-5%	\$2,140,530	\$23,267	90	Highly Effective	Low
Moderate	Duval Juvenile Residential Facility	120	50%	47% - 49%	1%	\$1,823,876	\$15,199	71	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Duval START Center (Closed)	53	49%	45% - 48%	1%	\$1,129,142	\$21,305	70	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Eckerd Intensive Halfway House	43	42%	41% - 45%	0%	\$2,867,295	\$66,681	67	Average	High
Moderate	Eckerd Youth Challenge Program	109	37%	38% - 40%	-1%	\$4,617,936	\$42,366	74	Effective	High
Moderate	Falkenberg Academy	292	49%	48% - 49%	0%	\$6,508,762	\$22,290	74	Average	Low
Moderate	Florida City Youth Center	41	49%	44% - 48%	1%	\$1,382,307	\$33,715	69	Below Average	Moderate
Moderate	Florida Environmental Institute	48	31%	36% - 40%	-5%	\$2,143,002	\$44,646	86	Highly Effective	High
Moderate	GOALS	86	44%	43% - 45%	0%	\$3,241,722	\$37,694	71	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Greenville Academy (DISC Village) (Provider changed)	57	47%	44% - 47%	0%	\$1,531,431	\$26,867	73	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Grove Unique Youth Services (GUYS)	45	29%	35% - 39%	-6%	\$2,533,210	\$56,294	88	Highly Effective	High
Moderate	GATE (DISC) (Provider changed)	57	63%	52% - 55%	8%	\$1,471,603	\$25,818	47	Least Effective	Low
Moderate	Gulf Coast Youth Academy (Premier)	310	46%	45% - 46%	0%	\$8,599,970	\$27,742	73	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Hastings Youth Academy Moderate Risk	327	45%	44% - 45%	0%	\$9,985,368	\$30,536	72	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Impact Halfway House	78	40%	40% - 43%	-1%	\$1,774,864	\$22,755	77	Effective	Low
Moderate	Jefferson Halfway House (DISC) (Provider changed)	62	35%	38% - 41%	-2%	\$1,560,973	\$25,177	80	Effective	Low
Moderate	Kelly Hall Halfway House	94	38%	39% - 41%	-1%	\$3,244,446	\$34,515	75	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Leslie Peters Halfway House	81	43%	42% - 45%	0%	\$2,150,775	\$26,553	73	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Liberty Juvenile Residential Facility	117	38%	38% - 40%	-1%	\$2,492,247	\$21,301	77	Effective	Low
Moderate	MERIT (DISC) (Provider changed)	44	59%	49% - 53%	6%	\$1,475,442	\$33,533	52	Least Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Madison Halfway House (DISC) (Provider changed)	68	62%	52% - 55%	6%	\$1,562,095	\$22,972	54	Least Effective	Low
Moderate	Mandala ATC Halfway House-Dual Diagnosis	90	48%	45% - 47%	0%	\$3,032,376	\$33,693	72	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Marion Youth Development Center (Career Systems)	215	53%	50% - 51%	1%	\$5,357,699	\$24,920	70	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Marion Youth Development Center (CSC)	25	40%	40% - 46%	0%	\$672,199	\$26,888	73	Average	Moderate
Moderate	MATS Halfway House	120	43%	42% - 44%	0%	\$4,247,850	\$35,399	72	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Miami Halfway House (State-Operated) (Provider changed)	45	31%	36% - 40%	-5%	\$1,291,949	\$28,710	89	Highly Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Nassau Halfway House	91	34%	37% - 39%	-2%	\$1,455,400	\$15,993	81	Effective	Low
Moderate	Oaks Juvenile Residential Facility	144	46%	44% - 46%	0%	\$3,468,409	\$24,086	73	Average	Low
Moderate	Okaloosa Halfway House	61	28%	34% - 37%	-6%	\$2,713,218	\$44,479	90	Highly Effective	High

\* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole percent

Table 16, (Continued). Male Residential Programs Listed by Program Type

Restrictiveness Level	Program Type/Program Name	N	Observed Recidivism Rate	Expected Recidivism Range	Percent Difference*	Two-Year Expenditures	Cost per Completion	PAM Score	Effectiveness Category	Cost Category
<b>Moderate Risk-Male (continued)</b>										
Moderate	Okaloosa Youth Academy	264	37%	37% - 38%	-1%	\$8,287,083	\$31,390	75	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Okeechobee Redirection Camp	131	39%	39% - 41%	-1%	\$3,566,890	\$27,228	76	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Palm Beach HWH (State-Operated) (Provider changed)	34	41%	40% - 45%	0%	\$1,163,315	\$34,215	72	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Panther Success Center Halfway House	233	56%	54% - 55%	2%	\$2,978,400	\$12,783	69	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Pensacola Boys Base	93	42%	41% - 44%	0%	\$1,662,607	\$17,877	74	Average	Low
Moderate	Polk Halfway House (State-Operated) (Provider changed)	64	52%	46% - 50%	2%	\$1,102,505	\$17,227	68	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Price Halfway House	81	48%	45% - 48%	0%	\$1,730,648	\$21,366	74	Average	Low
Moderate	San Antonio Boys Village	99	51%	47% - 49%	1%	\$1,804,225	\$18,224	71	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Santa Rosa Juvenile Residential Facility	41	39%	40% - 44%	-1%	\$985,675	\$24,041	77	Effective	Low
Moderate	Seminole Work and Learn Center	76	41%	41% - 43%	0%	\$1,373,960	\$18,078	74	Average	Low
Moderate	South Pines Moderate Risk	122	44%	43% - 45%	0%	\$3,224,517	\$26,430	73	Average	Low
Moderate	Southern Glades Youth Camp	198	45%	44% - 45%	0%	\$5,427,351	\$27,411	73	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Space Coast Marine Institute	91	35%	37% - 39%	-2%	\$2,147,278	\$23,596	80	Effective	Low
Moderate	Taylor Halfway House (DISC) (Provider changed)	77	39%	40% - 42%	-1%	\$1,855,816	\$24,102	77	Effective	Low
Moderate	Thompson Academy (YSI)	56	34%	37% - 40%	-3%	\$1,441,365	\$25,739	83	Highly Effective	Low
Moderate	Thompson Academy (PJS) (Provider changed)	260	44%	43% - 44%	0%	\$6,783,907	\$26,092	73	Average	Low
Moderate	Volusia HWH (State-Operated) (Provider changed)	63	43%	42% - 45%	0%	\$1,090,454	\$17,309	74	Average	Low
Moderate	West Florida Wilderness Institute	108	38%	39% - 41%	-1%	\$2,388,547	\$22,116	77	Effective	Low
Moderate	Youth Environmental Services	98	49%	46% - 48%	1%	\$2,264,776	\$23,110	70	Below Average	Low
<b>Boot Camps-Male</b>										
Moderate	Bay Boot Camp	73	55%	49% - 52%	3%	\$1,754,367	\$24,032	64	Below Average	Low
Moderate	Collier Drill Academy	112	38%	39% - 41%	-1%	\$1,805,233	\$16,118	78	Effective	Low
Moderate	Manatee Boot Camp	75	58%	51% - 54%	5%	\$1,886,123	\$25,148	57	Least Effective	Low
Moderate	Martin Boot Camp	90	22%	29% - 32%	-7%	\$3,405,450	\$37,838	94	Highly Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Pinellas Boot Camp	109	53%	49% - 51%	2%	\$3,511,082	\$32,212	66	Below Average	Moderate
Moderate	Polk Boot Camp-Male	141	43%	43% - 44%	0%	\$4,942,480	\$35,053	72	Average	Moderate
<b>Moderate Risk-Mental Health-Male</b>										
Moderate	DeSoto Juvenile Residential Facility-Dual Diagnosis	176	41%	41% - 42%	0%	\$10,174,225	\$57,808	68	Average	High
Moderate	Gulf Academy-Mental Health	71	42%	41% - 44%	0%	\$2,624,360	\$36,963	71	Average	Moderate
Moderate	JUST Program-MH (DISC) (Provider changed)	37	41%	40% - 45%	0%	\$1,928,888	\$52,132	69	Average	High

\* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole percent

Table 16, (Continued). Male Residential Programs Listed by Program Type

Restrictiveness Level	Program Type/Program Name	N	Observed Recidivism Rate	Expected Recidivism Range	Percent Difference*	Two-Year Expenditures	Cost per Completion	PAM Score	Effectiveness Category	Cost Category
<b>Moderate Risk Substance Abuse-Male</b>										
Moderate	ATC Substance Abuse Halfway House	101	38%	39% - 41%	-1%	\$3,713,985	\$36,772	75	Effective	Moderate
Moderate	Bassin House-Substance Abuse (DISC) (Provider changed)	43	44%	42% - 46%	0%	\$1,167,935	\$27,161	73	Average	Moderate
Moderate	Ft. Walton Adolescent Substance Abuse Program	79	35%	38% - 40%	-2%	\$3,224,940	\$40,822	77	Effective	High
Moderate	Riverside Academy-Substance Abuse	312	40%	40% - 41%	0%	\$12,551,150	\$40,228	71	Average	High
<b>High Risk-Male</b>										
High	ARC Serious Habitual Offender Program	45	47%	43% - 47%	0%	\$2,501,298	\$55,584	68	Average	High
High	Bartow Juvenile Correctional Facility	31	48%	43% - 48%	0%	\$857,955	\$27,676	73	Average	Moderate
High	Bartow Serious Habitual Offender Program	35	51%	44% - 49%	2%	\$1,669,506	\$47,700	63	Below Average	High
High	Broward Intensive Halfway House	61	56%	49% - 52%	4%	\$2,635,711	\$43,208	57	Least Effective	High
High	Cypress Creek High Risk (Securitor)	56	59%	50% - 53%	5%	\$1,891,269	\$33,773	55	Least Effective	Moderate
High	Dozier Training School	204	47%	46% - 47%	0%	\$10,153,817	\$49,774	69	Average	High
High	Eckerd Youth Development Center	215	46%	45% - 46%	0%	\$14,808,306	\$68,876	66	Average	High
High	Everglades Youth Development Center (Premier)	187	45%	44% - 45%	0%	\$7,813,788	\$41,785	71	Average	High
High	Hastings Youth Academy High Risk	147	48%	46% - 47%	0%	\$4,098,658	\$27,882	73	Average	Moderate
High	Hillsborough Intensive Residential Treatment (IRT)	15	47%	40% - 49%	0%	\$2,391,762	\$159,451	56	Average	High
High	Jackson Juvenile Offender Correctional Center	113	41%	40% - 42%	0%	\$4,744,789	\$41,989	71	Average	High
High	Manatee Youth Academy	54	57%	49% - 52%	5%	\$1,860,246	\$34,449	55	Least Effective	Moderate
High	Marion Juvenile Correctional Facility	84	39%	40% - 42%	-1%	\$3,109,469	\$37,017	75	Effective	Moderate
High	NAFI Intensive Halfway House	42	57%	47% - 52%	5%	\$1,290,832	\$30,734	56	Least Effective	Moderate
High	NAFI Serious Habitual Offender Program	51	29%	35% - 39%	-6%	\$2,724,744	\$53,426	88	Highly Effective	High
High	Okaloosa Intensive Halfway House	56	50%	45% - 49%	1%	\$2,780,151	\$49,646	66	Below Average	High
High	Polk JCF (Premier) (Provider changed)	343	48%	47% - 48%	0%	\$12,009,549	\$35,013	72	Average	Moderate
High	Sago Palm Youth Development Center	189	41%	41% - 42%	0%	\$5,701,975	\$30,169	72	Average	Moderate
High	Tiger Success SHOP (Youthtrack) (Provider changed)	31	32%	37% - 42%	-5%	\$1,776,297	\$57,300	84	Highly Effective	High
<b>High Risk Mental Health-Male</b>										
High	DeSoto Juvenile Correctional Facility-Dual Diagnosis	70	43%	42% - 45%	0%	\$15,389,084	\$219,844	56	Average	High
High	DeSoto Juvenile Correctional Facility-MH	39	28%	35% - 40%	-7%	\$3,670,291	\$94,110	85	Highly Effective	High

\* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole percent

Table 16, (Continued). Male Residential Programs Listed by Program Type

Restrictiveness Level	Program Type/Program Name	N	Observed Recidivism Rate	Expected Recidivism Range	Percent Difference*	Two-Year Expenditures	Cost per Completion	PAM Score	Effectiveness Category	Cost Category
<b>High Risk Substance Abuse-Male</b>										
High	Sago Palm Pathfinders-Substance Abuse	95	41%	41% - 43%	0%	\$4,395,906	\$46,273	70	Average	High
<b>High Risk Sex Offender-Male</b>										
High	Dozier SOP	85	19%	17% - 19%	0%	\$9,519,247	\$111,991	60	Average	High
High	Elaine Gordon SOP (Three Springs)	58	21%	18% - 20%	0%	\$4,963,766	\$85,582	64	Average	High
High	Jackson JOCC SOP	42	19%	17% - 20%	0%	\$4,421,534	\$105,275	61	Average	High
High	Kissimmee Juvenile Correctional Facility SOP	51	25%	20% - 23%	3%	\$5,244,981	\$102,843	51	Below Average	High
High	Manatee Adolescent Treatment SOP (Premier)	47	21%	18% - 21%	0%	\$4,209,706	\$89,568	63	Average	High
High	Okeechobee JOCC SOP (Securicor)	38	13%	16% - 19%	-2%	\$3,318,869	\$87,339	70	Effective	High
High	Sago Palm SOP	149	26%	22% - 23%	2%	\$10,568,030	\$70,926	59	Below Average	High
High	Three Springs SOP	44	20%	18% - 21%	0%	\$3,613,500	\$82,125	64	Average	High
<b>Maximum Risk-Male</b>										
Maximum	Cypress Creek JOCC Maximum Risk (Securicor)	27	26%	35% - 41%	-9%	\$1,936,857	\$71,735	95	Highly Effective	High
Maximum	Okeechobee JOCC Maximum Risk (Securicor)	26	42%	40% - 46%	0%	\$3,033,228	\$116,663	59	Average	High
Maximum	Omega JOCC	46	35%	38% - 42%	-3%	\$4,902,308	\$106,572	70	Highly Effective	High

\* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole percent

# Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

Bay Boot Camp	Report Date	Allegation	Findings
200501025	2/18/2005	<b>Unnecessary/Improper &amp; Excessive Force:</b> Juvenile A. S. was being taken from the Detention Center to the Boot Camp when he was taken to a hallway area and 9-10 Boot Camp Staff took the juvenile and threw him up against the wall and suspended him by holding his wrists, legs, arms and ankles. Then one staff grabbed the juvenile by his neck, applying pressure to his adam's apple and pushed his hand into it, until it began to cut off his air. The staff yelled for the juvenile to say, "sir, yes, sir" which the juvenile immediately complied with. The juvenile was forced to sign papers which he wasn't given time to read and comprehend. He was being intimidated into signing these papers.	Unsubstantiated
200503112	5/20/2005	<b>Medical Neglect:</b> Juvenile B. G. was in secure observation and told repeatedly by Staff J. W. to remove the blanket from his head. When the juvenile refused again, the blanket was taken from him. The juvenile then requested to call the Central Communications Center and stated that his room was cold and he did not have a blanket and also that the bridge of his nose was injured and he has not been seen by medical.	Unsubstantiated
200503370	5/30/2005	<b>Battery on Staff:</b> Juvenile L. D. swung and hit staff F. G. in the head and shoulder as he was being helped off of the ground. No injuries were reported.	Not Required
200503446	6/2/2005	<b>Attempted Suicide:</b> Juvenile D. H. wrapped a sheet around his neck, attempting to kill himself. The caller became aware of the incident at 8:07 a.m.	Investigation of <b>Inadequate Supervision</b> was Unsubstantiated
200600091	1/5/2006	<b>Improper Conduct/Excessive Force/Medical Neglect/Improper Supervision:</b> During physical training, youth M. A. passed out on the ground and was unresponsive to staff. 911 was immediately notified.	Still Pending

# Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

200600604		<b>Medical Neglect</b> - Youth D. L. alleged he has not been able to see a nurse for chest and throat pains. The youth stated that he swallowed dirt while performing a low crawl drill. When he attempted to tell staff that he wanted to see a nurse, he received a punishment for disobeying orders.	1/27/2006	Still Pending
<b>Martin Boot Camp</b>		<b>Allegation</b>		<b>Findings</b>
200502390		<b>Unnecessary/Improper force:</b> Juvenile R. H. wrote his mother a letter and alleged a staff member slammed him against the wall. His mother then notified the program concerning the situation. No injuries were reported. The exact date and time are unknown at this time.	4/19/2005	Abuse Registry notified, accepted case, and closed unfounded. Also, youth recanted allegations to program's Captain.
200507913		<b>Unnecessary/Improper Force:</b> The mother of youth B. G. alleged that he was physically abused by staff members E. B., A.C. and F.C.	12/7/2005	Unsubstantiated
200508197		<b>Battery on Staff:</b> Youth T. R. struck staff F. C. in the face several times. No injuries were reported.	12/19/2005	Not Required
<b>Manatee Boot Camp</b>		<b>Allegation</b>		<b>Findings</b>
200500530		<b>Suicide Attempt:</b> During the 10-minute checks by staff, juvenile R. S. was found with a belt wrapped around his neck. No injuries were reported.	1/25/2005	Investigation of <b>Inadequate Supervision</b> was Unsubstantiated
200500949		<b>Unnecessary/Improper Force:</b> Juvenile D. P. alleged that since entering the program on 2/3/05, he has been kicked in the mouth, head, and side. In addition, he had been pushed against the wall and choked by staff members G., S., M. and A. The caller became aware of this incident at 1:00 p.m.	2/15/2005	Unsubstantiated
200502884		<b>Unnecessary/Improper Force:</b> JPO G. M. spoke with juvenile F. D. and was told he was allegedly hit by staff. No injuries were reported. The exact time and date are unknown at this time.	5/11/2005	Unsubstantiated



# Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

200503388	5/31/2005	<p><b>Excessive Force:</b> Juvenile I.D. alleged excessive force against staff N. A. During a restraint, the juvenile alleged that staff A. pressed his knee into the juveniles back in a manner that cut off his airway.</p> <p><b>Suicide Attempt:</b> While in his room, juvenile D.F. attempted to tie a shoestring around his neck and tie the other end to a towel in the bathroom. Staff R.H. was conducting a 10 minute room check and removed the shoestring from around his neck. The juvenile did receive a red mark around his neck and was taken to medical for observation.</p>	<p>Unsubstantiated- nurse found no youth injuries.</p> <p>Not Required - no serious injury to youth who was examined by nurse and MH counselor and put on constant observation.</p>
200505565	8/30/2005		
<b>Pinellas Boot Camp</b>		<b>Allegation</b>	<b>Findings</b>
200500976	2/16/2005	<p><b>Unnecessary/Improper Force:</b> Juvenile J. D.'s mother, J. D., alleged her son told her on 2/12/05 that an unknown staff member slapped him while in the laundry room because he was not given permission to speak. The juvenile didn't want his mother to say anything in fear of retaliation.</p>	Unsubstantiated
200501691	3/20/2005	<p><b>Unnecessary/Improper Force, Improper Conduct:</b> The following information was submitted to the CCC via Cathy Corry after she obtained the anonymous information from the website, <a href="http://www.justice4kids.org">www.justice4kids.org</a>. On March 18, 2005, according to the anonymous complainant, her son, who is in Pinellas County Boot Camp, told her about the abuse that goes on there and how boys are having their heads slammed into a wall. One juvenile stated that he wanted to kill himself. The Drill Instructor's response was to put him in the middle of the basketball court</p>	Unsubstantiated
200502726	5/5/2005	<p><b>Excessive Force:</b> The mother of juvenile J.G. advised the CCC that her son alleged that he was walking down the hall and staff pushed him. The juvenile hit the wall and bruised his head. The juvenile started crying and the staff alleged that he was spit on. In addition, it was alleged that he was told not to tell anyone about the incident. The caller became aware of the incident on 5/3/05.</p>	Unsubstantiated

# Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

Collier Boot Camp		Allegation	Findings
200500212	1/11/2005	<b>Conduct/Sexual Nature:</b> Juvenile A. G. Placed a call to the Abuse Registry and alleged verbal, physical and sexual abuse by four or five staff members who came into his room. In addition, juveniles G. was asked to take off his clothes and hold his penis "and do things with it". Juvenile suffers from bi-polar disorder. The caller became aware of the incident at 10 a.m.	Unsubstantiated
200503351	5/30/2005	<b>Escape:</b> Juvenile M.E. Escaped between 2:30 am and 2:40 am, 10 minute checks. He apparently escaped from his room by opening the window and pushing the metal grate out and then climbed/jumped over 2 razor wire fences. Staff contacted Law Enforcement, they have 3 county sheriff's agencies, a helicopter, and 4 dogs looking for the juvenile. The juvenile's parents were notified and are at the facility now. The 3 staff on duty were alternating the 10 minute checks. Staff acted according to the facility policy and procedure, the staff are: D.M., Supvr, R.C. Drill Instructor, and F.B. Drill Instructor. The caller became aware of the incident at 3 am.	<b>Willful and Wanton Neglect/Falsification of Records:</b> The investigation into the escape resulted in the above allegations being substantiated.
200505266	8/17/2005	<b>Sexual Offenses:</b> Staff G.M. was arrested and charged with multiple counts of sexual misconduct. These offenses did not involve youth in the boot camp.	<b>Unlawful/Improper Conduct:</b> Substantiated
Polk Boot Camp		Allegation	Findings
200500700	2/2/2005	<b>Excessive Force:</b> Juvenile W. D alleged staff physically abused him by pulling his arm behind his back and then pulling his hand to the back of his head. Juvenile D. States that his left arm is sore and stated that it went numb for about a minute. As of this report, the juvenile hasn't been taken to medical for an assessment. The juvenile also stated that the program unfairly told his mother that she couldn't come to visit him any more. The group counselor became argumentative with the juvenile's mother and banned the mother from the group.	Unsubstantiated



# Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

200500973	2/16/2005	<b>Baker Acted:</b> While on one-on-one supervision, juvenile A. W. appeared to be depressed and was examined by the mental health counselor. The juvenile didn't injure himself.	Not Required
200501129	2/23/2005	<b>Attempted Escape:</b> Juvenile K.M. attempted to escape by climbing up the interior fence and onto the roof. The staff-to-juvenile ratio was 1:7	<b>Inadequate Supervision:</b> Unsubstantiated - procedures and PAR techniques (to secure youth) were followed; sufficient staff-to-youth ratio.
200501147	2/23/2005	<b>PAR Injury:</b> Juvenile D.E. was being non-compliant when he was taken down by staff M. S. Juvenile E. sustained a scratch on the left side of his head. The specific PAR technique is unknown at this time.	Not Required
200502058	4/5/2005	<b>Attempted Escape:</b> Juveniles E. F. and J. B attempted to escape the facility during the changing of classrooms. The juveniles were immediately captured on the facility grounds. Both juveniles were charged with attempted escape. The caller became aware of the incident at 1:45 pm.	Not Required - youth charged by law enforcement
200502199	4/11/2005	<b>Unnecessary/Improper Force:</b> Juvenile J.B. alleged that after he was apprehended on 4/5/05, boot camp staff took him behind the building and beat him up. His Juvenile Probation Officer (JPO) saw him on 4/8/05, but didn't notice any marks at that time. The juvenile did not report the incident to his JPO.	Unsubstantiated
200502860	5/10/2005	<b>PAR Injury:</b> Juvenile W.P. was restrained by staff Patrick Renney using a straight arm PAR technique. Juvenile P. busted his lip against the wall.	Not Required
200504728	7/25/2005	<b>PAR Injury:</b> Juvenile G. A. was injured during a wrap-around to a takedown, during which the juvenile received two small lacerations to his right elbow. The takedown was performed by staff G. N.	Not Required
200504928	8/3/2005	<b>Battery:</b> It was alleged that juvenile P.R. touched juvenile E.F in a sexual nature. The reporter indicated that the juvenile will be charged with battery.	Law enforcement investigated and no charges were filed.

# Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

			Excessive Force (original allegation) : Unsubstantiated. Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Sheriff's Office: Substantiated (use of profanity toward the youth)
200505393	8/22/2005	<p><b>Excessive Force:</b> Juvenile E.J. alleged that staff R.C. choked him and kneed him in the chest during a takedown.</p> <p><b>PAR Injury:</b> Youth N.N. was refusing verbal prompts to move and had to be restrained. Staff W.P., K.M., and G.N. performed a straight arm to a takedown. Youth N. sustained a superficial abrasion on the left side of his back and redness to his right shoulder. Abuse Registry was not called.</p>	
200505935	9/14/05		Not Required

Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

Corrective Action if required
NA
NA
NA
NA

Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

Corrective Action if required	
NA	
NA	
NA	
Corrective Action if required	
NA	
NA	
NA	

Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

NA	
NA	
Corrective Action if required	
NA	
NA	
NA	

Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

Corrective Action if required	
NA	
<p>A total of three staff were disciplined (including demotions &amp; suspensions). All Boot Camp staff received additional training. Work Orders were submitted for window locks, additional lighting, restring razor wire and trim trees. Several Policies and Procedures were also changed.</p> <p>appointment as a correctional officer was withdrawn, <i>not in good standing</i></p>	
Corrective Action if required	
NA	

Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006

NA	Although corrective action was not required, the program added more razor wire to enhance security.
NA	
NA	
NA	
NA	
NA	
NA	

**Boot Camp Incident Data 1/1/2005-1/26/2006**

Staff person suspended without pay for 23 hours and reassigned to work in the adult jail.	NA
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# Bay Boot Camp

200405007

07/30/2004

1 Unnecessary/Improper Force - (13a)

## Immediate Action:

Abuse Registry was notified and accepted case for investigation (Michelle #5314). Sergeant Garrett pushed juvenile [redacted] nose from bleeding. No other medical attention was given at this time. Text message sent to Residential and the RD.

## Determination Comments:

SHERIFF'S RESPONSE:

## CONCLUSION:

The allegations of child abuse by Offender [redacted] there is no evidence or sufficient cause to believe that this act was done with intent. Therefore, the allegation is not substantiated. It has been substantiated that Sgt. Garrett did fail to report this incident to his Chain of Command. It has been substantiated that Sgt. Garrett did fail to seek medical attention for the youth. It has been substantiated that Sgt. Garrett did fail to follow proper Policy and Procedures by using unapproved Exercises.

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:

- Sgt. Garrett will be suspended without pay for 3 working days not to run concurrent with days off.
- Sgt. Garrett will remain in a non-contact status until he receives retraining in the following areas:
- A.) Requirements in reporting any and all incidents to his Chain of Command written or verbal.
- B.) Proper procedures in reporting and requesting medical assistance for youth.
- C.) Proper practice of approved Physical Training Exercise, Motivational P.T. as per Policy of the Boot Camp Division and the Standard Operation Procedures.

SCB (12-12-04)

200405221

08/05/2004

1 Other - (1g)

## Immediate Action:

Juvenile [redacted] was seen by the in-house nurse who recommend that he be taken to Bay Medical Hospital. No text message needed.

200405435

08/11/2004

1 Not A Reportable Incident (18c)

## Immediate Action:

Juvenile [redacted] was observed by the in-house physician and was given over the counter medication. During a follow up by the physician, he recommend that juvenile visit his office at 9:00 pm. No text needed.

200405713

08/19/2004

1 Battery on Law Enforcement Officer - (2f)

## Immediate Action:

The juvenile was arrested and is currently detained at Bay County jail.

## Disposition Comments:

CONCLUSION:

The allegations of child abuse in this case are unfounded. The act of D. I. Price bumping the juvenile with his hat was unintentional. Charge of Battery on a Detention worker is substantiated and criminal charges are pending. The accusation of D. I. Price throwing the clothes in the juvenile's face is unfounded. The allegation by juvenile [redacted] that Lt. Helms used profanity is not sustained. There is not sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove this allegation at this time.

## CORRECTIVE ACTION:

D. I. Price was counseled in the proper technique of counseling juveniles.  
IDL

200405718

08/19/2004

1 Unnecessary/Improper Force - (13a)

Juvenile [redacted] alleged Drill Instructor Robert Price abused him by head butting him 3 times with the brim of his hat. No injuries were reported to juvenile

Bay Boot Camp

Immediate Action:

The Abuse Registry was notified, but didn't accept the case. Juvenile [REDACTED] reported this information from the Bay Detention Center after being arrested for Battery on a I.R.O. at the Bay Boot Camp. No other action has been taken at this time. A text page will be sent to the appropriate branch (Residential/COS).

Determination Comments: SHERIFF'S RESPONSE:

FINDINGS: The allegations of child abuse in this case are unfounded. Accusation of D.I. Price throwing the clothes in the Offender's face is unfounded. The allegation by Offender [REDACTED] that Lt. Helms used profanity is not sustained. The Charge of Battery on a Detention Worker is substantiated. Offender [REDACTED] did strike D.I. Price on the side of the head with a closed fist.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: D.I. Price's hat did come in contact with the offender's forehead while counseling him. D.I. Price was counseled in the proper technique of counseling offenders and told to keep a safe distance between juvenile and hat when counseling so that it does not unintentionally touch the juvenile. Offender [REDACTED] was criminally charged with the offense of Battery on a Detention worker.  
scb (12-15-04)

200405789

08/21/2004 08/21/2004 1 Attempted Escape - (7h)

Attempted escape by juvenile [REDACTED]

Immediate Action:

Juvenile [REDACTED] was placed in mechanical restraints and confinement. No text required.

Determination Comments: SHERIFF'S RESPONSE:

CONCLUSION:

Offender [REDACTED] was charged with Attempted Escape by Bay CSO.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN:

There are no corrective actions taken in this matter and no further information has been collected.

SCB (12-12-04)

200406187

09/01/2004 09/01/2004 1 Excessive Force - (13h)

According to juvenile [REDACTED] while being restrained by staff Price, his head was slammed against the wall.

Immediate Action:

The juvenile was seen by the nurse and injuries were found. Text not required.

Determination Comments: SHERIFF'S RESPONSE:

FINDINGS: Drill Instructor Price used an improper technique to place the offender against the chalkboard. While using the improper technique the offender's head did strike the chalkboard. There was no abuse, the act was unintentional.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Drill Instructor Price will receive a letter of reprimand to be placed in his official file. Drill Instructor Price will also be retained in the appropriate Use of Force techniques.  
scb (12-15-04)

200407811

10/30/2004 10/30/2004 1 Excessive Force - (13h)

Juvenile [REDACTED] alleged that he was physically abused by staff during a restraint. The juvenile indicated that after he became non resistant, Officers Patrick Garrett, Robert Price and Frank Guerrero continued to put their fingers into his throat so he couldn't breathe. The caller became aware of this incident at 7:35 a.m.

Immediate Action:

The juvenile was placed into secure observation because he indicated that he would escape the facility. The juvenile was allowed to place a call to the CCC. Text message sent to Residential/COS/Secy/DSecy.

Bay Boot Camp

Determination Comments: SHERIFF'S RESPONSE:

CONCLUSION:

The actions of Sergeant Garrett, Drill Instructor Price, and Drill Instructor Guerrero were necessary and appropriate given the circumstances. There is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim of improper or unnecessary use of force.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

It is recommended that this matter be closed without sanction or further action.

SCB (12-12-04)

200407825 10/31/2004 10/31/2004 1 Medical Neglect - (13n)

Juvenile [REDACTED] had pulled a muscle in his left arm while doing push ups. On Thursday 10/28/04 he requested medical attention, but staff Travis Perry refused to allow juvenile [REDACTED] to receive medical attention. On 10/31/04, he was asked again to do push ups and told staff he was unable, due to his injury. His response was considered aggressive and he was taken down.

Immediate Action:

The caller, staff Patrick Garrett, said Boot Camps don not report to AR and therefore no call was made to AR. The juvenile Plans to file a grievance if he is still not allowed to see the nurse. no text message is require.

200408210 11/17/2004 11/17/2004 1 Unnecessary/Improper Force - (13o)

Juvenile [REDACTED] alleged staff Jason Gainer and staff Steven Adamczyk inappropriately escorted him to the recreation field to do exercises by throwing his body into the door to open it. He is also alleging staff threw him against the ground and poked him in his head because he was sniffling. No injuries were reported.

Immediate Action:

The CCC was notified and took a report. The caller became aware of the incident at 5:57 pm. The AR was not notified due to program procedures. Text message sent to Residential and the RD.

Determination Comments:

SHERIFF'S RESPONSE:

FINDINGS: In the course of an investigation/inquiry conducted by Lieutenant Charles Helms regarding the allegations in this matter, it is found that the actions taken by staff were necessary and appropriate given the circumstances. There is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim of improper or unnecessary use of force.

ACTIONS TAKEN: It is recommended that this matter be closed without sanction or further action.

scb 01/16/05

Bay Boot Camp

200501025	02/18/2005	02/08/2005	1	Excessive Force - (13h)	Juvenile [REDACTED] was being taken from the RJDC to the Boot Camp when he was taken to a hallway area and 9-10 Boot Camp Staff took the juvenile and threw him up against the wall and suspended him, by holding his wrists, legs, arms and ankles. Then one staff grabbed the juvenile by his neck, applying pressure to his adam's apple and pushed his hand into it, until it began to cut off his air. The staff yelled for the juvenile to say, "Sir, yes, sir," which the juvenile immediately complied with. The juvenile was forced to sign papers, which he wasn't given time to read and comprehend. He was being intimidated into signing these papers.
Immediate Action:	2 Unnecessary/Improper Force - (13a) The juvenile could not contact the AR as the Boot Camp does not report to them. An appropriate text message will be sent.				
200503112	05/20/2005		1	Medical Neglect - (13n)	Juvenile [REDACTED] was in secure observation and told repeatedly by Staff Joseph Walsh to remove the blanket from his head. When the juvenile refused again, the blanket was taken from him. The juvenile then requested to call the CCC and stated that his room was cold and he did not have a blanket and also that the bridge of his nose was injured and he has not been seen by medical.
Immediate Action:	2 Other - (13l) The CCC was called and a report was taken. The caller stated that he will allow the juvenile to call the AR at the conclusion of this call. Text message sent to Residential/RD.				
200503370	05/30/2005	05/30/2005	1	Battery on Staff - (2z)	Juvenile [REDACTED] swung and hit staff Frank Guerrero in the head and shoulder as he was being helped off of the ground. No injuries were reported.
Immediate Action:	The Bay County Sheriff's Office was notified and charged the juvenile with Battery on Staff. The caller became aware of the incident at 8:30 pm, called the CCC, and left a message. Text message sent to Residential/RD.				
200503446	06/02/2005	06/02/2005	1	Suicide Attempt (22a)	Juvenile [REDACTED] wrapped a sheet around his neck, attempting to kill himself. The caller became aware of the incident at 8:07 a.m.
Immediate Action:	The juvenile was seen medical and had a small scratch on the upper cheek, no other injuries known. The juvenile is currently under secure observation and suicide watch. Text message sent to Residential and COM.				
200600091	01/05/2006	01/05/2006	1	Excessive Force - (13h)	During physical training, youth [REDACTED] passed out on the ground and was unresponsive to staff. 911 was immediately notified.
			2	Improper Conduct - (13g)	
			3	Improper Supervision - (13p)	
			4	Medical Neglect - (13n)	
			5	Natural - (1d)	
Immediate Action:	BMS arrived and transported the youth to Bay Medical Center. The youth has been admitted to the hospital and is listed in stable condition. It is not known why the youth collapsed. The caller gained knowledge of the incident when it occurred (CST). Text page will be sent to Residential/Med.				
Total Number of Cases:			15		

Committee Budget Issues for 2006 Legislative Session

Criminal Justice Appropriations		Agency Legislative Budget Request 2006-07				Governor's Recommendations 2006-07			
03A Issue Title		FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS
1	CORRECTIONS, DEPT OF								1
2	Legislative Start-Up (Recurring Law And Policy) - Operating	27,736.50	2,037,071,939		67,874,269	27,736.50	2,037,071,939		67,874,269
3	Realignment Of Contractual Services		13,960,688		611,000		13,916,597		611,000
4	Deduct Contract Services From Expenses Category		(13,960,688)		(611,000)		(13,916,597)		(611,000)
5	Department Of Management Services State Building Rental Increase		(58,768)						5
6	Transfer Correctional Privatization Commission Funding To New Category		(107,363,219)		(2,093,348)		(107,363,219)		(2,093,348)
7	Transfer Correctional Privatization Commission Funding From Old Category		107,363,219		2,093,348		107,363,219		2,093,348
8	Transfer DMS Human Resource Services Statewide Contract To Department Administration Program		(251,749)				(282,075)		8
9	Transfer DMS Human Resource Services Contract From Other Budget Entities		251,749				282,075		9
10	Transfer Probation And Restitution Center Program From Community Facility Operations					(4.00)	(273,997)		10
11	Transfer Probation And Restitution Center Program To Probation Supervision					4.00	273,997		11
12	Non Recurring Public Work Squads To Operating Appropriation Categories				9,065				12
13	Food Service Contract						1,500,000		13
14	Funding For Increased Cost Of Fuel And Utilities						5,137,084		14
15	Direct Billing For Administrative Hearings						1,357		15
16	Annualization Of Public Work Squads From Lump Sum Appropriation Categories				(11,050)				16
17	Annualization Of Public Work Squads To Operating Appropriation Categories				11,050				17
18	Increase In Criminal Justice Estimating Conference Inmate Population	299.00	18,265,650	1,958,226		350.00	18,366,939	2,297,655	18
19	Washington Annex Support Costs	70.00	3,858,008	363,730		70.00	3,858,008	363,730	19
20	Dade Transitional Care Unit Support Costs					70.00	7,672,218	217,002	20
21	Taylor Annex Support Costs	41.00	2,022,078	188,360		41.00	2,022,078	188,360	21
22	Jessica Lunsford Act	15.00	930,624	111,555		15.00	930,624	111,555	22
23	Reduction For Contract Pricing Of Electronic Monitoring						(991,340)		23
24	Eliminate Supervision Of Pre-Trial Intervention Offenders By Department Of Corrections					(76.00)	(4,368,916)		24
25	Eliminate Probation And Restitution Centers						(3,172,964)		25
26	Transfer Funds From Grants And Donations To Federal Grants				(1,225,305)				26
27	Transfer Funds From Grants And Donations To Administrative Funds				(164,219)				27
28	Transfer Funds To Federal Grants Trust Fund				1,225,305				28
29	Transfer Funds To Administrative Trust Fund				164,219				29
30	Transfer Risk Management Insurance From Grants And Donations Trust Fund				550,597				30

Committee Budget Issues for 2006 Legislative Session

Criminal Justice Appropriations		Agency Legislative Budget Request 2006-07				Governor's Recommendations 2006-07			
	D3A Issue Title	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS
31	Transfer Risk Management Insurance To Sale Of Goods And Services Trust Fund				(550,597)				(550,597)
32	Contract Price Level Adjustments						(4,109,833)		
33	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Deduct						(1,090,000)		
34	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Add						1,090,000	1,090,000	
35	Continuation Of Criminal Justice Training				31,859				31,859
36	Increase Federal Reimbursement Of Housing Alien Inmates in Florida'S Prisons								1,300,000
37	Review Startup - FCO (Recurring Debt Service)		17,232,559				17,232,559		
38	Debt Service		(987)				(987)		
39	Environmental Projects		16,359,332	16,359,332			16,359,332	16,359,332	
40	Support Facilities		1,615,000	1,615,000	3,000,000		1,615,000	1,615,000	3,000,000
41	Maintenance And Repair		6,840,000	6,840,000			6,840,000	6,840,000	
42	Increased Capacity		72,000,000	72,000,000			73,000,000	73,000,000	1,500,000
43	Special Purpose		169,880	169,880			169,880	169,880	
44	CORRECTIONS, DEPT OF Total	26,161.50	2,176,305,315	99,606,083	70,915,193	26,206.50	2,179,132,978	102,252,514	73,752,934
45									
46									
47	JUVENILE JUSTICE, DEPT OF								
47	Legislative Start-Up (Recurring Law And Policy) - Operating								
48	Realignment Of Contractual Services Budget From Expenses - Deduct	5,022.00	450,614,849	(4,641,480)	180,887,607	5,022.00	450,614,849	(4,641,480)	180,887,607
49	Realignment Of Expense Budget To Contracted Services - Add				2,306,861		4,641,480		2,306,861
50	Department Of Management Services State Building Rental Increase		(62,073)						
51	Funding For Increased Cost Of Fuel And Utilities						210,925		242,968
52	Direct Billing For Administrative Hearings						24,367		
53	Reduce Contracted Probation						(1,000,000)		
54	Eliminate Early Delinquency Intervention Program (EDIP)						(1,689,109)		
55	Reduce Non-Secure Residential Commitment Positions		(2.00)				(2.00)		
56	Reduce Vacant Positions						(16.00)		
57	Reduce Excess Trust Authority								(266,414)
58	Reduce Unfunded Juvenile Crime Prevention/Early intervention Trust Fund Budget Authority				(1,000,000)				(1,000,000)
59	Reduce Unfunded Grants And Donations Trust Fund Budget Authority				(1,000,000)				(1,000,000)
60	United States Department Of Labor Grant - Transfer From Grants And Donations Trust Fund				(813,722)				(813,722)
61	United States Department Of Labor Grant - Transfer To General Revenue			813,722			813,722		
62	Salary Parity For State Operated Detention, Probation And Residential Direct Care Staff						2,664,069		1,867,398
63	Adjustment For State's Share Of Secure Detention Cost						2,442,456		
64	Substance Abuse Overlay Slots For Residential Services			4,001,130			4,001,130		



Committee Budget Issues for 2006 Legislative Session

Criminal Justice Appropriations		Agency Legislative Budget Request 2006-07				Governor's Recommendations 2006-07			
	D3A Issue Title	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS
65	Day Treatment Slots For Aftercare/ Conditional Release Services		230,930				230,930		
66	Intensive Mental Health Services For Residential Services		1,462,925				1,462,925		
67	Enhanced Specialized Treatment Services		3,712,829				3,712,829		
68	Curriculum Development And Maintenance For The Training Of Direct Care Staff And Supervisors						288,939	140,402	
69	Funding For Challenge Grants - Girls Initiatives		600,000				600,000		
70	Grants For Fiscally Constrained Counties - Detention Center Costs		4,483,745				4,483,745	4,483,745	
71	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Deduct						(4,221,345)		
72	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Add						4,221,345	4,192,235	
73	Review Startup - FCO (Recurring Debt Service)		2,895,735				2,895,735		
74	Code Corrections		3,060,000	3,060,000			3,060,000	3,060,000	
75	Support Facilities						1,518,860	1,518,860	
76	Maintenance And Repair		15,939,973	15,939,973			15,939,973	15,939,973	
77	JUVENILE JUSTICE, DEPT OF Total	5,020.00	487,553,765	23,483,719	178,073,895	5,004.00	492,276,345	29,335,215	179,917,837
78									
79									
81	LAW ENFORCEMENT, DEPT OF Legislative Start-Up (Recurring Law And Policy) - Operating	1,972.00	108,829,440		186,856,633	1,972.00	108,829,440		186,856,633
82	Align Salary Rate Among Budget Entities - Reduce								
83	Align Salary Rate Among Budget Entities - Increase						(87)		
84	Realignment Of Operating Capital Outlay Budget - Deduct						87		
85	Realignment Of Operating Capital Outlay Budget - Add								
86	Back Out Contracted Services From Expenses		(657,373)		(3,435,762)		(657,373)		(3,435,759)
87	Add Back Contractual Services Budget To Appropriate Category		657,373		3,435,762		657,373		3,435,759
88	Department Of Management Services State Building Rental Increase		(294,351)		(267,347)				
89	Florida Capitol Police - Correct Funding Source Identifier - Deduct								(11,009)
90	Florida Capitol Police - Correct Funding Source Identifier - Add Back								11,009
91	Deduct Excess Trust Fund Authority				(1,101,458)				(1,101,658)
92	Nonrecurring Portion Of Special Session B 2005 - HB 1-B				1,184,564				
93	Fuel Costs And Rent Increases For Private Space And Fees To Credit Card Companies		951,657		683,660				
94	Increase For Fees To Credit Card Companies								
95	Funding For Increased Cost Of Fuel And Utilities								503,435
96	Investigative Equipment				1,535,000		63,772		42,688
97	Crime Lab Equipment		1,000,000	1,000,000					770,000
98	Direct Billing For Administrative Hearings								740,000
99	Special Session B 2005				(2,206,603)				9,290
100	Build Out Of Domestic Security Staffing To Support Preparedness Efforts And Security Planning	25.00	1,400,222	244,181	450,915				

Committee Budget Issues for 2006 Legislative Session

Criminal Justice Appropriations		Agency Legislative Budget Request 2006-07				Governor's Recommendations 2006-07			
	DJA Issue Title	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS
101	Provide Capitol Police Security For The R.A. Gray Building Of The Department Of State	13.00			695,932	13.00			695,932
102	Increase In Violent Crime Investigative Emergencies						500,000		
103	Criminal History Records Workload Growth And Data Sharing Among School Districts	4.00			206,740	4.00			206,740
104	Reduction In Violent Offender Incarceration Truth-In-Sentencing Federal Grants				(35,000,000)				(35,000,000)
105	Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) And Port Inspection And Criminal History Records Byrne Grants - Grants And Donations Trust Fund								(2,142,115)
106	Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) And Port Inspection And Criminal History Records Byrne Grants - General Revenue						2,033,331		
107	Criminal Justice Standards And Training Trust Fund Line Leases - Deduct				(1,313,533)				(1,446,041)
108	Line Leases From Operating Trust Fund - Add								
109	Integrated Criminal History System				1,313,533				1,313,533
110	Sworn Structured Retention And Recruitment Plan				6,068,640				6,068,640
111	Capitol Police Compression Compensation Plan		251,510				251,510		
112	Performance Based Compensation Plan		101,447		53,433		101,447		53,433
113	Expansion Of Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Offender Database To Include All Felons		4,462,040	2,796,040		2.00	1,078,603	460,186	
114	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Deduct						(250,000)		
115	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Add						250,000	250,000	
116	Maintenance Of Pepper Building Security		120,405						
117	Maintenance And Repair		539,500	539,500	78,300		539,500	539,500	78,300
118	Special Purpose		1,204,049	1,204,049					
119	LAW ENFORCEMENT, DEPT OF Total	2,014.00	116,565,919	5,783,770	159,316,763	1,991.00	113,397,603	1,249,686	157,648,610
120									
121	LEGAL AFFAIRS/ATTY GENERAL								
122	Legislative Start-Up (Recurring Law And Policy) - Operating	1,359.00	37,376,297		129,449,258	1,359.00	37,376,297		129,449,258
123	Back Out Contractual Services Budget From Expenses		(191,000)		(919,050)		(191,000)		(919,050)
124	Add Back Contractual Services Budget		191,000		919,050		191,000		919,050
125	Department Of Management Services State Building Rental Increase		(44,528)		(105,577)				
126	Civil Enforcement - Correct Funding Source Identifier - Deduct								(72,168)
127	Civil Enforcement - Correct Funding Source Identifier - Add Back								72,168
128	Transfer Out - Realignment Of OCO Budget			(206,525)	(440,853)		(206,525)		(440,853)
129	Transfer In - Realignment Of OCO Budget			206,525	440,853		206,525		440,853
130	Funding For Increased Cost Of Fuel And Utilities						154		12,821
131	Direct Billing For Administrative Hearings								40,165
132	Office Of The Attorney General Training Unit	5.00	267,708	20,620	46,263				
133	Inspector General	1.00	82,761	5,243					



Committee Budget Issues for 2006 Legislative Session

Criminal Justice Appropriations			Agency Legislative Budget Request 2006-07				Governor's Recommendations 2006-07			
	D3A Issue Title	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS	FTE	GENERAL REV	NR GENERAL REV	TRUST FUNDS	
134	Transfer Funding From Legal Services Trust Fund To General Revenue	(6.00)			(707,258)	(6.00)			(707,258)	
135	Transfer Funding To General Revenue From Legal Services Trust Fund	6.00	707,258			6.00	707,258			
136	Transfer From Grants And Donations Trust Fund To General Revenue								(4,530,296)	
137	Transfer To General Revenue From Grants And Donations Trust Fund						4,530,296			
138	Needs Assessment/Feasibility Study		450,000	450,000						
139	Department-Wide Lapse Factor Reduction		407,012		730,350		407,012		730,350	
140	Elections Commission Rate Increase				46,333				46,333	
141	Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Salary Retention Program				104,902					
142	Transfer Medicaid Fraud Recovery Funds To General Revenue								12,000,000	
143	Commission On The Status Of Women - Annual Reports, Studies, Analyses And Enhancements	1.00	69,399	4,891						
144	Minority Crime Prevention Program		700,000							
145	Property Premium		6,945							
146	Multi-Agency Consumer Education And Public Awareness Advertising Campaign From Nationwide Legal Settlement				1,000,000				1,000,000	
147	Transition Assistance For The Executive Branch						500,000	500,000		
148	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Deduct						(6,089,163)			
149	Adjust Project Funding To Nonrecurring - Add						6,089,163	6,089,163		
150	LEGAL AFFAIRS/ATTY GENERAL Total	1,366.00	40,922,852	480,754	130,504,271	1,359.00	43,521,017	6,589,163	138,041,373	
151										
152										
153	PAROLE COMMISSION									
154	Legislative Start-Up (Recurring Law And Policy) - Operating	148.00	9,623,259			148.00	9,623,259			
155	Department Of Management Services State Building Rental Increase		(4,122)							
156	Funding For Increased Cost Of Fuel And Utilities						5,334			
157	Replacement Of Motor Vehicles		33,066	33,066						
158	Additional Equipment - Motor Vehicles		85,375	85,375						
159	Clemency	20.00	1,822,866	169,600			1,832,320	159,880		
160	Temporary Commissioners		20,000							
161	Mileage Reimbursement Rate		32,000							
162	Victims Of Crime Act Grant	1.00			47,736	1.00			47,736	
163	PAROLE COMMISSION Total	169.00	11,612,444	288,041	47,736	149.00	11,460,913	159,880	47,736	
164	Criminal Justice Appropriations Grand Total	36,730.50	2,834,260,295	129,642,366	538,917,854	36,709.50	2,839,788,856	139,586,458	549,408,690	